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Note
Indigenous Reparations Re-Imagined:
Crafting a Settlement Mechanism for
Indigenous Claims in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
Sean Burke∗
INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights (IACHR/ “the Commission”) and the Inter1
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR/ “the Court”), these
two organs of the Organization of American States (OAS) have
addressed human rights promotion and protection in the
2
member States of the OAS. Together, the IACHR and the
3
IACtHR comprise the Inter-American System (IAS). For over
twenty years they have been developing legal theories focused
on the plight of indigenous populations within the region of the
4
American States. While the IACtHR has found in claimants’
∗
J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Creighton
University, 2004. The author would like to thank the staff and editors of the
journal, especially all those who helped improve this note.
1. The OAS created the IACHR in 1959 to observe and report on the general
human rights situation in member states of the OAS, in fulfillment of the
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the first human rights instrument
introduced in the Americas in 1948. In 1965, the IACHR was authorized to
examine petitions alleging human rights abuses in member states. Then, after it
adopted the American Convention of Human Rights in 1969, the OAS created the
IACtHR as a judicial forum in which to adjudicate cases of human rights abuses
brought against states which are parties to the Convention. See What is the
COMMISSION
HUM.
RTS.,
ORG.
AM.
STS.,
IACHR?
INTER-AM.
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2010).
2. Id.
3. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (2nd
ed. 2004).
4. See id. at 32–33 (discussing the inclusion, first in 1972 and more
consistently since 1993, of indigenous issues in country reports issues by the

123

BURKE Note Formatted 2

124

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

12/9/2010 2:02 PM

[Vol 20:1

favor in indigenous claims of property rights, protection under
5
the law, and right to life, the history of reparations reveals an
inconsistency in the provision of adequate compensation for
6
these claims.
Currently, the IAS faces difficulties ensuring justice for
indigenous claimants. Often, the IAS responds to claims in an
untimely fashion and the abuses in the original claim generally
7
continue to occur even after favorable judgments. The IAS
needs new strategies in order to address these two threats to
indigenous claimants’ access to justice.
At the same time, the IAS recognizes that the influx of new
claims has hampered the adjudicative bodies’ effectiveness to
8
address the claims. One proposal to deal with this problem is
9
the increased use of friendly settlement mechanisms. A variety
of factors suggest that such mechanisms will become important
tools for improving the effectiveness of all regional human
rights bodies, including the IAS. While the IAS has yet to
IACHR); see also id. at 259–71 (providing an overview of the IACHR and IACtHR
jurisprudence on indigenous rights). These theories have centered on the use of
reparations as the mechanism for redress of the various abuses perpetrated against
these populations. Id. See generally Q&A: Indigenous Rights Appeals Increasingly
NEWS
(Oct.
8,
2009),
Reach
Inter-American
System,
IPS
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48775 [hereinafter, Q&A] (describing how
indigenous communities are increasingly accessing the Inter-American Human
Rights System).
5. See S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 267–68 (discussing cases that have
reached the IACtHR, specifically that of the Awas Tingni in Nicaragua, and the
Court’s judgments therein).
6. See id. at 269 (noting that reparations in the Awas Tingni case were
problematic for a number of reasons, including the calculation of the sum and the
implementation of the Court’s orders).
7. Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 101, 104 (2008) (noting the
“rate of compliance with the remedial orders in the Inter-American system is lower
than in the European system”).
8. See Address by the President of IACHR, Paulo G. Carozza, INTER-AM.
COMMISSION
HUM.
RTS.,
ORG.
AM.
STS.
(JUNE
3,
2008),
http://www.cidh.org/Discursos/06.03.08eng.htm [hereinafter Carozza] (addressing
the need to find creative methods in managing an increasing backlog of cases before
the Commission).
9. Id. (discussing a proposed project intended to increase the use of friendly
settlements in the Commission). Friendly settlements area a common feature of
international human rights systems and represent the primary manner in which
parties may agree to a resolution of the dispute. The European and IAS systems
require Court approval of the settlement to confirm that it conforms to applicable
human rights laws. See JO M. PASQUAALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (Cambridge University Press
2003)
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decide on a comprehensive settlement mechanism, improving
the use of indigenous reparations claims by borrowing aspects
of other settlement techniques provides one avenue for better
efficiency and justice.
Part I of this Note describes the hurdles facing indigenous
claimants in the IAS, while Part II introduces tools of
international dispute resolution. Part III of this Note lays out
the broad foundations for using such tools to transform
indigenous reparations into a type of friendly settlement
mechanism and explains how such a mechanism provides a
better method of resolving indigenous property rights claims in
the IAS than the current system.
I. CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS
REPARATIONS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM
The path for an indigenous claimant seeking redress in the
IAS is challenging. The claims of the Yakye Axa, an indigenous
people in Paraguay, exemplify the difficulties claimants often
10
encounter. Like many indigenous groups throughout Latin
America, the Yakye Axa have suffered systematic
discrimination, oppression, and isolation at the hands of
11
various regimes. Even after the decline of twentieth century
despotic governments and the establishment of international
12
norms recognizing various rights of indigenous populations,
10. Along with the Yakye Axa, another indigenous group, the Sawhoyamaxa,
also won a favorable judgment from the IACtHR that was not implemented by the
Paraguyan government. See ‘We’re Only Asking for What is Ours’ Indigenous
Peoples in Paraguay - Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa, AMNESTY INT’L 3 (Mar., 2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR45/005/2009/en (follow “Download:
PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter AMNESTY] (noting the failure of the Paraguayan
government to respect the IACtHR’s judgments). In August of 2010, the IACtHR
ruled against Paraguay for a third time in the context of indigenous rights when it
found the government had violated the right to life, communal property, and
judicial protection of another indigenous group, the Xakmok Kasek people. See
Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2010 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 (Aug. 24, 2010).
11. Id. at 2 (profiling the plight of Paraguay’s Indigenous population, including
the Yayke Axa).
12. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 49–184 (documenting the
development and content of contemporary human rights norms protecting
indigenous peoples). For a historical assessment about the lack of State recognition
of international attempts to recognize indigenous populations, see Anaya’s analysis
of international norm development. Id. at 34 (arguing that early international law
efforts to recognize indigenous rights “succumbed to a state-centered Eurocentric
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domestic judicial and political structures have not consistently
protected the rights of indigenous groups such as the Yakye
Axa. The destruction of indigenous lands, and the inability and
unwillingness of governments to reclaim them from third-party
13
landowners, represent significant barriers contributing to
delayed domestic justice. Unsuccessful domestic legal battles
led the Yakye Axa to seek international adjudicative solutions
14
from the IAS.
In 2005, after nearly twelve years of adjudication in
Paraguayan domestic courts and the IAS, the Yakye Axa won a
15
favorable judgment from the IACtHR. The IACtHR found
violations of the Yakye Axa’s rights to judicial protection,
16
property, and life. Despite the IACtHR’s ruling, however, the
deadline for the Paraguayan government’s compliance with the
17
judgment has passed. The struggle of the Yakye Axa
represents the basic challenges of claimants seeking justice
including: navigating the long and unpredictable domestic and
international judicial processes, fighting for appropriate
reparations standards, and ultimately having a successful
claim rendered worthless through ineffective enforcement of
the judgment.
A. WAITING FOR JUDGMENT
The primary obstacles facing claimants such as the Yakye
Axa are the time and resources necessary to bring a claim to
the IAS. A fundamental principle of regional human rights
adjudication is that claimants must first exhaust all domestic
18
remedies before going to the IACHR. Even after meeting this
19
and other preliminary qualifications, resolution requires a
system that could not accommodate indigenous peoples and their cultures as
equals”).
13. See AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing Congressional opposition to
measures to restore the land to the Yakye Axa).
14. Id. at 2.
15. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2005 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005).
16. Id. at §§ VIII–X. See also Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, RT. TO EDUC. PROJECT,
http://www.right-to-education.org/node/679
(last
visited
Jan.
12,
2010)
(summarizing the basic rulings of the court).
17. AMNESTY, supra note 10.
18. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, art. 46(1)(a) (1992) [hereinafter Convention]. See generally What is
the IACHR?, supra note 1.
19. Convention, supra note 17, art. 46(1)(b) (the filing must come “six months
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long waiting period due to the existing backlog of cases facing
20
the IAS.
An increase in the volume of claims in recent years has
slowed the pace of the IAS. Between 2004 and 2008, over 1,300
21
complaints were filed with the Commission each year; in 2009,
22
only 122 petitions were processed. This backlog has forced
concerned administrative officials to begin to look toward
alternative measures of dispute resolution to solve the basic
23
problems caused by the influx in pending cases. The current
backlog will likely deny claimants timely and efficient justice.
The current caseload of the IACHR suggests that new
developments in settlement mechanisms will be necessary to
24
improve the overall effectiveness of the systems. Currently,
25
the IACHR allows for a procedure called friendly settlement.
The procedure, which the IACHR was originally reluctant to
utilize, allows States to avoid the publication of an unfavorable
report by agreeing to reach a friendly settlement with the
26
complaining party. The authority of the IACHR to induce
States to settle human rights claims is generally understood as
27
persuasive rather than binding authority. Since the language
from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the
final judgment”); id. art. 46(1)(c) (the subject matter must not be in the process of
adjudication in another international proceedings); id. art. 46(1)(d) (the filing must
contain basic logistical information).
20. See generally What is the IACHR?, supra note 1.
21. Inter-Am. Comm’n of Human Rights, Annual Report 2009, ch. 3(B)(1)(d),
OEA/Ser.L/V/II 134, Doc. 5, rev. 1 (Feb. 25, 2009). Complaints include all written
complaints regarding a supposed violation of a relevant human rights instrument.
Over 2,000 petitions in 2009 were evaluated. Id. at ch. 3(B)(1)(d).
22. Id. at ch. 3(B)(1)(c). In all 1,450 cases are pending before the Commission
as of the end of 2009. Id. at ch. 3(B)(1)(g),
23. See Carozza, supra note 8. In his 2008 address on the state of the
Commission, the President of the Inter-American Commission listed the measures
the Commission was taking to help ease the financial and administrative burden of
protecting human rights in the region. Id.
24. Id.
25. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
INTER-AM. COMMISSION HUM. RTS., ORG. AM. STS., art. 40 (Oct. 28-Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic18.RulesOfProcedureIACHR.htm
[hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
26. See Patricia E. Standaert, The Friendly Settlement of Human Rights
Abuses in the Americas, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 521, 523 (1999).
27. See Generally ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN THE AMERICAS (2000), available at
http://cidh.oas.org/Indigenas/TOC.htm (stating that the Commission will only
facilitate settlement during the indigenous claims procedure “for a fixed period of
time…[and only] if the parties are so disposed…”).
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of Article 48(1)(f) of the American Convention of Human Rights
simply states that the Commission “shall place itself at the
disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a
28
friendly settlement,” the impetus falls on the States to
demand and/or agree to settlement proceedings on their own
accord and without any mandatory ruling from the IACHR.
Although logistical questions of resources and willpower may
affect the eventual scope of a settlement regime, a key obstacle
to the implementation of these mechanisms is the ability of the
29
IAS to mandate and push for settlements. Many scholars
believe, however, that the IAS will begin to implement some
type of stronger friendly settlement mechanism, though no one
30
has indicated what friendly settlement system that may be.
B. DEVELOPING AND ENFORCING AN APPROPRIATE REPARATIONS
STANDARD FOR PROPERTY CLAIMS
As evidenced by the IACtHR’s ruling in favor of the Yakye
31
Axa’s property rights, the current regional and international
standards for reparations represent a significant improvement
32
over previous remedies available to indigenous communities.
This evolution has also occurred as Latin American
governments have taken their own initiative to interpret
28. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American
Convention].
29. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 40.2 (clarifying that parties
initiate and ultimately control the continuation of any friendly settlement process).
30. See generally Standaert, supra note 26, at 523–24 (highlighting problems
with the friendly settlement system).
31. International human rights movements have made significant strides in
utilizing and evolving the reparations concept away from simply a small monetary
compensation. See Arturo J. Carrillo, The Relevance of Inter-American Human
Rights Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 512–27 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006)
(analyzing the types of reparations awarded by the IACtHR to human rights
victims).
32. See Organization of American States, Principal Guidelines for a
Comprehensive
Reparations
Policy,
1–2,
Inter-Am.
Comm'n
H.R.
OAE/Ser/L/V/II.131, doc. 1 (Feb. 19, 2008); See also Interview with Víctor
Abramovich,, supra note 4 (quoting from the special Rappatour who sees
improvements over previous reparations systems because “[t]he system is
consolidating a collection of principles, and achieving the resolution of particular
cases, through friendly settlements or precautionary measures.”). See generally
Conference, Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach,
56 Am. U. L. Rev. 1376 (2007) available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/la
wrev/56/reparations.pdf?rd=1
(tracing
the
development,
evolution,
and
effectiveness of the IAS’s reparations jurisprudence).
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34

human rights norms and orchestrate reparations programs.
While there is not a bright line standard set in the Inter35
American system, the IACHR has generally held that just
compensation:
[S]hould materialize in the form of individual measures
calculated to constitute restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for the victim, as well as general measures of
satisfaction
and
guarantees
of
non-repetition
False[R]eparations should consist of measures that tend to
make the effects of the violations committed disappear. Their
nature and amount will depend on the damage caused both at
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary levels. Reparations cannot
involve enrichment or impoverishment of the victim or his or
36
her heirs.
In order to evaluate appropriate remedies within this
standard, an adjudicative body must determine the source of
law by which to judge the merits of the case. Aside from
violations of judicial protection, this choice of law generally
falls between two broad categories; indigenous property and
37
indigenous right to life claims.
The various characteristics of right to life claims may make
them less suitable for the current settlement procedures offered
38
by the IACHR. Some advocates recognize that settlement
options in these types of claims are limited, and ultimately self39
defeating. Claimants and other advocates of indigenous rights
may also wary of the bargaining and negotiation aspects of
33. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 114–15.
34. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Minorities at Risk Project,
Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Honduras, (31 December 2003)
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3a8d2b.html (recognizing an improvement
in living conditions for the Miskito people, a Honduran Indigenous minority group,
since the late 1980s).
35. See Organization of American States, Principal Guidelines for a
Comprehensive Reparations Policy, supra note 31, at 1.
36. Id. at 2 (noting "The State must play a primary, rather than secondary,
role in guaranteeing victims' effective access to reparations, in accordance with the
standards of international law.")
37. See American Convention, supra note 28 (defining the right to life and
right to property). The IACtHR ruling in favor of the Yakye Axa divided the
violations into three categories: property, life, and judicial jrotection. See case cited
supra note 15.
38. See Standaert, supra note 26, at 520 (noting that mediation in the context
human rights adjudication may not fully encourage respect for human rights
because of the crimes are horrific, the abusers are not held criminally accountable,
and victims may not feel a sense of justice).
39. See id. at 530–32.
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dispute resolution when the other stakeholders have
perpetrated heinous crimes against the fundamental human
40
rights of indigenous peoples.
Reparations advocates have experienced success in
developing a systematic jurisprudence of indigenous property
41
rights against various other actors. With the pattern of abuse
stretching from the colonization of the western hemisphere,
indigenous groups have found themselves with little recourse to
reclaim lands held by large territorial landowners, businesses,
42
States’ growing interest in
and the government itself.
minerals and valuable property has continued to render
indigenous land an attractive target for exploitation. Working
43
in concert with or with the tacit permission of State authority,
landowners are often successful in repressing indigenous
protests and attempts to reclaim such lands or assert their
44
rights. For example, in the case of the Yakye Axa, the third
party landowners were able to convince legislative authorities
to table the executive branch’s request to carry out the
45
IACtHR’s judgment. Even more prevalent are claims that a
State acted in its official capacity to destroy indigenous
46
communities. Despite these obstacles, progress has been
40. See id. at 528 (noting that the power imbalance between individual and
state parties represents a grave challenge in mediation’s ability to secure human
rights).
41. Ruth Rubio-Marín, Gender and Collective Reparation in the Aftermath, in
THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE
REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 381, 385–87 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2009) (laying out a theory of collective reparations
focused on group characteristics, such as indigenous culture); See generally
Organization of American States [OAS], The Human Rights Situation of the
Indigenous People in the Americas, Inter-Am. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, Doc. 62, Ch. 1
(2000), available at http://www.cidh.org/indigenas/chap.1.htm (outlining the history
of indigenous jurisprudence in the IACHR).
42. See S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 142 (noting that early international
property law recognized indigenous land rights via historical use but allowed for
termination of such rights through unilateral government action or simple
monetary transfers).
43. See generally AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 2–5 (explaining how
governmental authorities have failed to restore land to the indigenous people).
44. See id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Community of Rio Negro of the Maya
Indigenous People and its Members, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/Gu
atemala844.05eng.htm (detailing how the Guatemalan government ordered armed
forces to violate the right to property and the right to life of the Maya indigenous
community at the Río Negro so as to secure the land for the use of a Hydro-electric
dam).
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noticeable, at least in the recognition of international norms
protecting indigenous rights to property, cultural integrity,
47
nondiscrimination, and self-determination. Scholars, activists,
and even some court decisions are beginning to recognize not
only real property claims, but also intellectual property
48
claims.
Even when indigenous claimants win a favorable judgment
in the IACHR or the IACtHR, however, the IAS struggles to
49
implement and enforce the judgment. Once a claimant brings
the claim into the Inter-American human rights system, the
State is generally less cooperative than if it had taken the
50
initiative to set up a reparations program on its own. If the
parties reach a friendly settlement agreement that the IACHR
51
approves, the State may still stall or refuse to implement the
52
agreed upon measures of reparation. These tactics range from
47. S. JAMES ANAYA, supra note 3, at 142.
48. The current movement to have indigenous customs recognized in
intellectual property law represents the most recent trend in indigenous rights
activism. This relatively new movement represents a significant increase in
awareness of indigenous rights, but does not mean the more significant claims of
real property have primarily been met. See Maui Solomon, Intellectual Property
Rights
and
Indigenous
Peoples
Rights
and
Obligations,
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/ra01/ms2.html#Anchor-Introduction-15970
(last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (arguing the indigenous framework of property rights
incorporates a principle of reciprocity, so that obligations of the cultural tradition
are balanced against the right to use and exploit cultural values including real
property).
49. At a Conference discussing challenges to implementation , then Secretary
of the IACHR, Santiago A. Canton, stated
Apart from Colombia and Peru-which have adopted some legislation to effect
compliance with certain aspects of international judgments and reports in
individual cases-there are no other examples of institutional mechanisms designed
to comply with reparations granted in the Inter-American system. Today, the
Commission’s recommendations on individual cases are complied with only when
there is a combination of political will and a search for creative ways to comply
even if the measures adopted are not technically permitted under domestic law.
Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach, supra note 32,
at 1455.
50. See Generally International Center for Transitional Justice and Human
Rights Association, Design Parameters for a Reparations Program in Peru (Sept.
2002) http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/Parameters.eng.pdf (suggesting that
the most successful reparations programs have been those developed by
governments themselves and not those mandated by international arbitration
bodies).
51. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 40.5 (explaining how the
IACHR verifies that the claimants have agreed to the settlement and that the
resolution is “based on respect for the human rights recognized in the American
Convention on Human Rights”).
52. See Natalia Ruiz Díaz,: Int'l Backing for Indigenous Land Claims, INTER
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53

designating the disputed land as protected preserves, citing
domestic property laws as obstacles to reparation, and
deferment of the issue to State legislatures where the influence
of third party landowners and corporations often stall
54
Even if the government acquiesces to a
proceedings.
judgment, it often claims a lack of power to effectuate or compel
55
In addition, those
the cooperation of the landowner.
government officials who attempt to implement IAS judgments
or recommendations may find themselves in danger of
56
prosecution. In the case of the Yakye Axa, the State used the
57
tactic of deferring the matter to its legislative process.
II. THE ECHR’S SPECIALIZED
FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT TOOLS
Many
scholars
and
practitioners
recognize
the
underdeveloped use of dispute resolution tactics in areas of
international law, particularly outside the realm of
58
international economic agreements. However, the concept of
friendly settlement has not been completely abandoned in
contentious proceedings, as evinced by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), where friendly settlement is used with

PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENDY, Oct. 9, 2009 available at http://www.ipsnews.net/ne
ws.asp?idnews=48789 (outlining the delayed implementation of governmentpromised reparations to indigenous communities).
53. Id. (noting that the Paraguayan government declared part of previously
promised land a protected preserve so as to prevent the indigenous community
from claiming all of the granted territory).
54. See AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 5 (detailing the Paraguayan Congress’
tabling of legislation designed to pass into law a bill already signed by the
president giving lands to the indigenous peoples of Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa).
55. See Id. (highlighting the stalled political process even after presidential
approval of the transfer of land to the Yakye Axa indigenous community).
56. Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach,
supra note 32, at 1455.
57. See AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 11.At this stage of the claim, the Court
rendered a favorable judgment and the government tried to acquiesce to the
judgment. Nevertheless, the standard of reparations was still not met. These are
the claims that require the most attention and creative problem solving from
reforms attempting to increase the effectiveness of the reparations process.
58. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International
Economic Law-Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Noneconomic Areas, 2.2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 189, 191–92 (1999) (arguing that there are
many lessons to be learned by international lawyers working within the UN and
ICJ procedures concerning human rights from compulsory adjudication methods
common in international economic law).
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59

some success. The difficulty lies in transferring this relative
success into gainful settlements of the specific claims of
indigenous peoples.
A. ECHR MECHANISMS FOR SETTLEMENTS
The ECHR, as an adjudicative body dedicated to resolving
60
human rights claims, has much more experience than the IAS
in dealing with friendly settlements between States and human
61
Despite the ECHR’s under utilization of
rights victims.
62
friendly settlements, it has developed relatively flexible and
efficient procedures and enforcement mechanisms.
Rule 62 of the ECHR Rules of Court govern the initiation
of friendly settlement proceedings by mandating that the
Regsitrar “enter into contact with the parties with a view to
63
While similar language is
securing a friendly settlement.”
present in the American Convention, the IACHR must only
“make itself available” to the parties to assist with friendly
settlement. Rule 54A in the European Convention goes on to
state that the Court may require parties to include settlement
64
proposals in the initial response phase of a joint procedure.
65
Finally, the newly authorized Protocol 14 will significantly
change friendly settlements by permitting friendly settlement
59. See generally, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION
BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES AND PRIVATE PARTIES: CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION, AND ARBITRATION 35–59 (2000) (introducing the main elements of the
settlement process in the court).
60. Like the American Convention on Human Rights, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
provides the overarching structure and content for the European Human Rights
system. See generally Gregory S. Weber, Who Killed the Friendly Settlement? The
Decline of Negotiated Resolutions at the European Court of Human Rights, 7.2
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 215, 215–17 (2007) (discussing the decline in friendly
settlements after reaching its peak in 2002 and 2003).
61. See Id. This does not mean, however, that the ECHR utilizes friendly
settlements as much or as effectively as possible.
62. Id.
63. Eur. Ct. H.R., Rules of Court, Rule 62(1) (2009) [hereinafter Rules of
Court].
64. Id. at Rule 54A(1).
65. Before February of 2010, Russia blocked the passage of Protocol 14 based
on fear that such advanced settlement procedures would increase pressure to settle
various claims, including those brought by Chechnya. In June of 2010, Russia
agreed to pass Protocol 14. See Haley Wojdowski, Russia Upper House Ratifies
Europe Rights Court Reform Protocol, JURIST LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Jan. 27,
2010,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2010/01/russia-upper-house-ratifieseurope.php.
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negotiations even before the Court declares a case admissible.
In clarifying that completed friendly settlements end with a
“judgment,” Protocol 14 ensures that The Committee of
Ministers will have oversight of the enforcement of the
67
agreement.
B. PILOT JUDGMENTS
Pilot judgments represent another recent development the
ECHR implemented to increase the efficiency and efficacy of
68
Beginning with the first principle
large-scale settlements.
69
the ECHR has utilized this
pilot judgment in 2005,
mechanism primarily to compel fledging democratic
governments to align their judicial practices with the rule of
70
law.
The first step in the process of a pilot judgment requires
the ECHR to determine whether a large pool of potential
claimants exist who will potentially have similar claims to that
71
of the plaintiff in the case in question. The ECHR then rules
on the “pilot case” and allows its judgment to impact the
72
previously identified “class” of similarly situated parties.
While the affected State party implements the appropriate
solution as determined by the ECHR, all other cases in the
similar “class” are paused until the Committee of Ministers
confirms that the state in the pilot case implemented the
73
original judgment. If the Committee finds the implementation
is successful, then the additional lawsuits continue with a
66. See Explanatory Report to the CETS 194, § IV, cl. 92 (2009) available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm
[hereinafter
Explanatory Report].
67. Id. § IV, cl. 94 (explaining that The Committee of Ministers may step in if
either party shows signs of improper enforcement of the agreement).
68. See generally Eur. Ct. H.R., The Pilot-Judgment Procedure,
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF4E8456-77B3-4E67-8944B908143A7E2C/0/Information_Note_on_the_PJP_for_Website.pdf. As a relatively
new concept, scholars have recently begun to comment about the efficacy of this
new mechanism. While most agree the ECHR has the proper authority to carry out
pilot judgments, the debate focuses on whether such judgments represent longterm solutions to the efficiency of the Court or should only be used during the
transition period for young democracies.
69. See generally Broniowski v. Poland, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 509, 510–38
(2004) (citing the case where the first principle pilot judgment was used.)
70. See The Pilot Judgment Procedure, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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74

similar settlement. This type of mechanism frees up the
ECHR from various claims that will eventually settle after
ECHR renders a pilot decision. In using this tool, the ECHR
has compelled governments, such as Poland, to pre-emptively
address certain cases before they are brought into the pilot
75
judgment process. The ECHR has already administratively
disposed of more than twenty standing cases and potentially
76
1.1 million other individual claims.
After the parties agree to some type of friendly settlement
in the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers ensures compliance
77
with the agreement. As the primary enforcement arm of the
entire ECHR, the Committee of Ministers conducts periodic
assessments to ensure parties implement friendly settlement
78
agreements just as they would a judgment from the Court.
However, the Inter-American System, as an organ of the OAS,
does not have a parallel body from which to seek help in
79
enforcing its decisions.
III. THE FUTURE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: THE CASE FOR A
SETTLEMENT APPROACH
Indigenous reparations represent an opportunity to create
a new type of friendly settlement mechanism that addresses
the challenges indigenous claimants currently face. Along with
the creation of such a mechanism, the IAS must foster a culture
where friendly settlement can thrive and where all stakeholders recognize the importance of including indigenous
reparations in the new creative process.
74. Id.
75. Id. The two principal pilot judgment cases both involve Poland and were
friendly settlement decisions issued in 2005 and 2008. Broniowski v. Poland,
(plaintiff was suing for compensation of his land that had been “repatriated” after
Polish agreements with Ukraine).
76. Eur. Ct. H.R., Cases or Groups of Cases against Poland, 2–4 (2009),
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/03_cases/Poland_en.pdf.
77. Rules of Court, supra note 63, at Rule 43 (reiterating the Committee of
Ministers’ role in supervising settlement enforcement).
78. The Committee derives its mandate and funding from the EU. Id.
79. See Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human
Rights System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
31 HUM. RTS. Q. 856, 882 (2009) (contrasting the work of the Committee of
Ministers in the ECHR with OAS’s lack of political pressure on offending
governments and arguing that this lack of enforcement stands as a key challenge to
the effectiveness of the IACHR).
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A. CREATING A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM INFORMED BY
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
The ECHR’s advanced jurisprudence, significant case log,
creative settlement practices, and stronger settlement rules
and procedures have helped create a more dynamic and prolific
80
system of settlement procedures than the IAS. All settlement
mechanisms developed by the Inter-American Commission
should look to these European practices for guidance. The most
significant systems in place with regard to the indigenous
issues by the ECHR consist of the pilot judgments and the
ECHR’s new rules and procedures, particularly Protocol 14,
requiring parties to engage in settlement negotiations even
81
before a claim is deemed admissible. Adopting this particular
procedure would allow for quicker resolution of indigenous
claims because it would funnel them into the indigenous pilot
judgment reparation mechanism before entering the general
pool of claims to the IACHR.
Because of the lack of indigenous issues facing the ECHR,
any settlement mechanism based primarily on indigenous
issues must extrapolate lessons and techniques designed for
other systems. The pilot judgment mechanisms are designed to
82
address many of the same concerns facing the Commission,
namely finding solutions to widespread human rights violations
in the midst of a growing backlog within a structure outfitted
with an ineffective implementation system. Therefore, lessons
drawn from the ECHR’s pilot judgment program would
function as the legal framework from which to craft settlement
83
issues in the IAS.
80. For most of the past decade, the rate of settlement has been near twelve
percent. Eur. Ct. H.R., Some Facts and Figures: 1959-2009, 3, 14–15 (2009),
available at www.echr.coe.int.
Only with the added influence of Russia upon the court and its refusal to enter into
any settlement negotiations has that number steadily decreased to about 4%. Eur.
Ct. H.R., Survey of Activities: 2007, 1, 59 (Strasbourg 2008).
81. See Rules of Court, supra note 63, at Rules 33, 43, 54A, and 62. These
rules encourage settlement by keeping proceedings private, providing enforcement
mechanisms through the Committee of Ministers, and allowing the Court to
condition the hearing of the case only after an attempt towards friendly settlement.
82. Costas Paraskeva, Human Rights Protection Begins and Ends at Home:
The ‘Pilot Judgment Procedure’ Developed by the European Court of Human Rights,
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_hrlcpub/Paraskeva.pdf (highlighting
various benefits of the Pilot Judgment system, including the general principal that
it could afford more effective legal remedies domestically).
83. Id. According to the regional body conducting the preliminary research on
the pilot programs, Article 46 of the European Convention of Human Rights grants
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As a consolidation tool, the primary benefit of pilot
judgments is the ability to use the pilot decision and apply its
84
redress to the all other similar claims. Guided by principles of
equal protection, an effective pilot judgment could provide
governments with a model that quells fear of ongoing, endless
85
litigation surrounding indigenous claims. Dealing with the
problem at hand the first time in a measured, effective, and fair
way would help guide policy for lawmakers and temper
concerns over future conflicts.
In terms of the actual mechanism in which the indigenous
pilot judgment program would fit, the IAS already has in place
a structural body to stand as the model. Currently, before a
claim even reaches the adjudicative portion of the IACHR, the
working group on admission criteria evaluates the admissibility
86
of each claim. Either by adding duties to this specific group, or
creating a new working group, the foundational mechanism for
a settlement procedure should be able to funnel all possible
reparations settlements into a special process before they enter
the IACHR general pool. This new working group should be
comprised of independent experts and at least one adjudicative
official from a neutral country. The specialists must have
considerable transitional justice background with a deep
knowledge of Latin American political realities and the various
principles and standards of settlements. This team will become
a third party arbitrator that seeks the best result for both
parties in dispute, independent of any political gain.
The situation facing Paraguayan indigenous groups, while
not unique to indigenous claims, provides a template for this
working group. After their long legal battle within the country
and through the IAS, the Yakye Axa expected to finally attain
justice when a favorable judgment was secured from the court,
buttressed by presidential support. However, even with
presidential support, justice has been stalled, and is frustrating
the outcome of the long path the claimants traveled through

such authority. By analogy to Article 48.1.f in the Inter-American Convention, any
modified pilot-judgment system geared towards indigenous settlements should
have the same legal legitimacy.
84. See generally EUR. CT. H.R., The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, supra note 68.
85. Id.
86. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 35 (mandating that a
working group shall meet prior to each regular session in order to study the
admissibility of petitions and make recommendations to the plenary of the
Commission).
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87

the courts.
With a pilot judgment program or any other specialized
settlement mechanism in place, the Yakye Axa could have
involved all the State stakeholders in the process earlier so as
to increase the effectiveness of implementation. With a trained
working group advising and facilitating a settlement between
the claimants, and with government stakeholders generally
88
sympathetic to the claimants, the Yakye Axa may have
89
avoided the domestic struggles that ensued post-judgment.
Although some may believe the settlement process is as
adversarial as litigation (or even more so), the threat of
creating a precedent that other indigenous claimants can take
advantage of may convince States that a settlement would offer
a better outcome than the possible negative political and
international fallout. States would therefore be more mindful of
the long-term planning of solutions so as to avoid a situation in
which one judgment in which they refuse to engage creates a
90
flood of claims they cannot handle. Furthermore, in the pilot
judgment settlement process, the predictability afforded by the
technique would give the key State party stakeholders the time
and information needed to garner support for the settlement
87. See generally Díaz, supra note 52.
88. Although President Fernando Lugo (the first President to be elected from a
different political party in over sixty years) assumed power well after the claim was
under review in 2008, the flexibility of the Court’s procedural mechanism that
allows transferring of cases to the settlement procedures at any point may have
accommodated this significant change in the political context. See generally Alexi
Barrionuevo, Ex-Cleric Wins Paraguay Presidency, Ending a Party’s 62-Year Rule,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2008, at A7.
89. President Lugo’s willingness to adhere to the judgments in the Yakye Axa
case by asking for Congress to expropriate the lands necessary for reparations
reveals the willingness, if not the political capital, of some Latin American
governments to be open to settlements. If he had been consulted and designated a
stake-holder in a settlement proceeding rather than as the complying party on the
losing side of an adversarial judgment, he could have set clear expectations, timeframes, and courses of action for how to fulfill a settlement agreement. As an
architect of a reparations program, the current challenges of enforcement through
legislative channels may have been averted. See Andres Gaudin, Paraguay:
Embattled President Lugo Gets Help from Neighbor Brazil, NOTISUR - SOUTH
AMERICAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
(July
31,
2009),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/PARAGUAY:+EMBATTLED+PRESIDENT+LUGO+
GETS+HELP+FROM+NEIGHBOR+BRAZIL.-a0204688078
(detailing
the
President’s commitment to indigenous issues even in the face of current political
problems).
90. See EUR. CT. H.R., The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, supra note 68
(explaining how Poland improved its domestic remedies to the claims before the
Pilot judgment was handed down so as to have more control over the ultimate
remedy).

BURKE Note Formatted 2

2011]

12/9/2010 2:02 PM

INDIGENOUS REPARATIONS RE-IMAGINED

139

91

domestically.
While the argument for a more streamlined and effective
settlement system within the IACHR may depend partly on
other logistical considerations, convincing stakeholders that
one element of the system should focus solely on indigenous
reparations is not simple. For all of the possible benefits stated
above, the current system has not changed fundamentally
because current incentives for keeping the status quo are too
92
great for both parties.
From the State perspective, many of those with reparation
programs already in place may point to the inadequacies of
93
such programs as reason to fear further commitment to them.
Even States with relatively successful programs may be
reluctant to give up governmental control over them, which
often allows lawmakers to find ways to limit or lessen the
94
influence of such programs.
From the claimant’s side, the idea of settlement may run
95
counter to basic notions of justice. Receiving a judgment from
the Court is not always the main goal of taking a case through
the Inter-American System. Oftentimes the symbolic action of
holding States accountable in an adjudicatory setting helps
shift the balance of power towards claimants. This symbolic
96
judgment may not be as strong with a settlement agreement.
Therefore, the IAS must take into account such considerations
and begin laying the groundwork for implementation of a
settlement mechanism by changing the culture of settlement
and convincing stakeholders that such a mechanism is
necessary.

91. See Costas Paraskeva, Human Rights Protection Begins and Ends at
Home: The ‘Pilot Judgment Procedure’ Developed by the European Court of Human
Rights, 3 HUM. RTS. L. COMMENT. (2007), http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/s
hared_hrlcpub/Paraskeva.pdf (highlighting various benefits of the Pilot Judgment
system, including the general principal that it could afford more effective legal
remedies domestically).
92. See Susan H. Shin, Comparison of the Dispute Settlement Procedures of the
World Trade Organization for Trade Disputes and the Inter-American System for
Human Rights Violations, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 74–6 (highlighting the inherent
flaws of the Inter-American settlement system).
93. See Id.
94. See Id.
95. See Id.
96. See Id.
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C. CREATING A CULTURE OF SETTLEMENT
In changing the culture of settlements, the IAS must do
more to encourage and facilitate settlement use. Currently, the
IACHR can only encourage friendly settlements by “plac[ing]
97
Although
itself at the disposal of the parties concerned.”
amending the American Convention to change this language
and give the IACHR the authority to order mandatory
98
settlement procedures is virtually a political impossibility, the
IACHR should funnel more cases towards settlement and
provide established mechanisms that clearly show each party
the benefits of settling early. Currently, many view the
settlement system as a barrier to reaching a finalized IAS
99
ruling on the merits of the claim. Settlements may lack the
100
comprehensive results of a full domestic reparations system.
This may make potential parties skeptical of the approach and
less willing to invest resources into a settlement process. The
concern is especially strong for indigenous claimants, who may
feel from years of previous failures and unequal bargaining
that attaining justice from the State party in any context will
101
If indigenous claimants knew, however, that
be difficult.
filing a claim with the IACHR would give them an opportunity
to enter right away into a reparations settlements where they
can partially dictate the terms (assuming their claim met
97. Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, at art. 40.1.
98. While the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty were adopted
by fourteen and eleven nations respectively, the domestic political dynamics
involved in developing a separate protocol for settlements, especially when
guidelines are already in place, remains an unrealistic and ultimately impractical
endeavor. See generally Nadia Ezzelarab and Brian Tittemore, Round Table
Discusses U.S. Ratification of Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v2i1/ia
conv21.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (highlighting the difficulty of ratification
from the perspective of the United States domestic laws and policy).
99. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 90, at 68, 74 (stating “The Commission’s
recommendation for the Court action is severely limited by the ‘friendly settlement;
requirement.” and “One inherent defect of the entwined Commission/Court system
is the heavy emphasis on utilizing the ‘friendly settlement’ system.”).
100. For a comprehensive explanation of types of reparations for victims, see
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ASSOCIATION, DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR A REPARATIONS PROGRAM IN PERU 16–19
(2002), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/Parameters.eng.pdf.
101. See generally Standaert, supra note 26, at 530–31 (noting that in the
context of domestic violence, equalizing the power of the parties at the bargaining
table can be difficult).
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established guidelines of the mechanism), they may be more
amenable to filing claims and settling before a judgment by the
102
IACHR or IACtHR.
The onus is then on the facilitator to fashion a settlement
regime that educates and guides the Parties so as to highlight
the efficiencies and advantages of solving the claim outside of
103
This shift in emphasis
the traditional adversarial system.
would allow the Commission to funnel cases into genuine
settlement processes, and give the IACHR more authority to
assert pressure on parties.
The current changes of the friendly settlement procedures
for the IACHR reveals the Commission’s influence in forcing
settlement may be stronger than in the past. Therefore, in the
short term, the IAS can take intermediate steps towards these
goals even without a fully developed settlement mechanism in
place. Members of the IACHR should suggest that parties
engage in settlement before admissibility hearings.
Furthermore, members should attend trainings in settlements
facilitation so as to better understand the best practices of
104
When the IAS eventually
international friendly settlement.
implements full mechanisms, such as the Indigenous
Reparations process proposed in this note, the culture of the
IACHR and IACtHR will be more agreeable to its
implementation.
D. CONVINCING STAKEHOLDERS TO USE THE INDIGENOUS
REPARATIONS PROCESS AS A SETTLEMENT TOOL
When the IAS eventually implements changes to the
settlement process, profound questions will remain about the
appropriateness of using settlement mechanisms for indigenous
claims. The IAS has already developed a fairly robust
jurisprudence in the area of indigenous rights, and the goal of
an indigenous reparations settlement mechanism is to continue
this process. Some worry that the Inter American System’s
current recognition of indigenous property rights will soon fade,
102. See generally id., at 536–37 (arguing that settlements provide victims an
opportunity to craft their own vision of justice).
103. Compare Explanatory Report, supra note 66 (explaining that Protocol 14 is
designed to shift settlement power back to the facilitators) with Rules of Procedure,
supra note 25, at art. 4.2 (explaining that parties hold primary settlement power).
104. Examples include sending members of the IAS to conferences hosted by
the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution and the U.S. Federal Judicial Center,
bodies dedicated to the advancement of friendly settlement techniques.

BURKE Note Formatted 2

142

12/9/2010 2:02 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 20:1

105

which makes the task all the more difficult.
However, the creation of an effective settlement
mechanism designed specifically to address indigenous
repartitions would flow from the IAS’s main strength: its
flexibility and ingenuity in developing varied and efficient
106
solutions to historical and ongoing human rights abuses.
Furthermore, without sudden changes in the speed of State
107
acquiescence to court mandated reparations, the IAS must
continually find ways to assert its influence creatively.
Even when cases survive the cumbersome process and
obtain a favorable judgment, implementation remains difficult.
Using a settlement mechanism to bring a State party on board
at an earlier stage in the proceedings may facilitate higher
108
rates of compliance and therefore provide effective remedies.
The Paraguayan cases reveal this reality for indigenous
advocates. Even though the Yakye Axa successfully won a
favorable judgment from the Court, justice has not been
forthcoming. Since the current standstill in the legislative
process signals an indefinite delay in securing the courtmandated judgment, claimants have a better chance at working
within a settlement mechanism that encourages all parties to
the table faster and provides them with the possibility of more
109
timely results.
The existence of these problems is pushing the InterAmerican System to look towards settlement solutions that
both draw upon and go beyond previously established

105. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 90, at 66–72 (arguing that the court’s recent
interpretation of the property consideration of non-active usage signals a
reluctance to extend Indigenous property rights).
106. See Carozza, supra note 8 (arguing that the Commission’s strength is in its
multiple methods of addressing human rights issues, including judicial
proceedings, country reports and visits, special rappatourships, and educational
initiatives).
107. See Shin, supra note 90, at 66 (arguing that States generally refuse to
acquiesce easily).
108. See Armstrong Wiggins, Director of Indian Law Resource Ctr. Washington
D.C. Office, Introductory Statement at Policy Roundtable: Tomorrow's Human
Rights: Addressing the Challenges Ahead (Nov. 11, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.indianlaw.org/node/517) (recognizing that apart from a universal
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, there “is a consistent regional body
of law developed by both the Commission and the Court that is supposed to
expedite the negotiation, settlement, and ultimately the adversarial judicial
process…[but that] states ignore such a body of law on the rights of indigenous
peoples” throughout the negotiation process and even after unfavorable judgments).
109. See generally AMNESTY, supra note 10, at 11.
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110

jurisprudence. Unless indigenous advocates are willing to
develop solutions to these overarching problems, the backlog in
111
The
the IAS and the lack of enforcement will continue.
current
settlement
process
is
underdeveloped
and
112
underutilized. Therefore, it is most prudent for indigenous
advocates, and human rights advocates in general, to push for a
specialized Indigenous Reparations settlement mechanism.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Inter-American Commission continues to establish
its legitimacy as a fundamental protector of human rights for
indigenous populations in the American States, the current
challenges of the increasing backlog of claims, limited
resources, and contentious cases will continue to demand
creative solutions. Already a fixture of the European system,
progressive-friendly settlement procedures and mechanisms
provide one such solution to these problems. The IAS must
develop its own versions of these settlement tools to maximize
their appeal to both indigenous claimants and State parties.
Instead of resisting such mechanisms for fear that they will not
fully secure human rights, indigenous claimants should view
them as an opportunity to expand current reparations models
that have provided an infrastructure, if not full remedies, to
other reparations issues. Endowed with predictive and
consolidative tools, such as pilot judgments, States should find
incentives from participating in an indigenous settlement
regime that may ultimately condensing the claims against it
and bolster its human rights record.

110. See Wiggins, supra note 108 (arguing that “[T]he Commission should not
stay silent before such an attitude. On the contrary, it should engage in the
negotiation process by stating the governing principle of law on the issue under
negotiation and by promoting the respect of such a principle by all parties.”).
111. Id. (noting that while hearings held before the Commission on the growing
development into indigenous lands have increased in frequency, the burgeoning
caseload of the Commission prevents them from being utilized for state-specific
solutions).
112. Since the year 2000, only a total of 8 cases in any given year were decided
via settlement agreement. See generally Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights, Annual Reports 2000–2008, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annual.eng.htm.

